



Neuroscience: Decision, Insight and Intention 
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A new study of perceptual decision making in which subjects were asked to report, after indi-
cating their choice, precisely when they felt they had made a decision, supports the idea that 
conscious awareness occurs when evidence has accumulated beyond some threshold. 
 
In 1983, Benjamin Libet [1] published a study that quickly became a centerpiece of philo-
sophical and pub debates on free will. Libet examined the properties of the bereitschaftspo-
tential (German for ‘readiness potential’), a slight deflection in the brain’s electroencephalo-
graphic signal that can be observed prior to deliberate action. The signal, which is thought to 
emanate from the premotor cortex, slowly grows stronger over time as the action becomes 
more imminent. But, in its weaker form, it stretches back surprisingly far in time. Libet want-
ed to know whether it went back far enough that it actually preceded the conscious urge to 
move. If it did, that would imply the conscious urge occurred as a consequence of the prepa-
ration, perhaps as a side effect of the actual process that initiated the decision — after the 
train had left the station so to speak.  
Since Libet’s original study [1], several others have confirmed and extended his re-
sults (for example [2,3]; reviewed in [4]). More broadly, the use of self-reporting to study 
conscious awareness is a mainstay of neuroscience (for example [5]) The key trick has been 
to precisely measure the time at which subjects felt the conscious urge to move. Libet devised 
a small clock-like function on his oscilloscope that swept in a circle; subjects watched and 
  
when they reported the urge to move made a mental note of the position of the rotating dot. 
Assuming people could take a mental snapshot of the clock face at the moment they con-
sciously decided, the plan provided a good measure of the time of the conscious urge. 
As reported by Kang et al. [6] in this issue of Current Biology, our reports of the time 
at which we become consciously aware may indeed be accurate. The authors examined the 
report times of subjects performing a dot motion discrimination task and found that they obey 
several lawful properties associated with sequential sampling models.  
 
Can we accurately measure our conscious awareness of the urge to move? 
Libet’s method of measuring the time of conscious urges was crucial to his experiment. But, 
since the original study, the question of whether it accurately measures the time of the con-
scious urge has attracted a great deal of scrutiny (for example [7]). The question of what 
leads to our awareness of our internal volition has not been resolved. Kang et al. [6] believe 
that conscious awareness is the result of some subconscious process that increases in intensity 
and as it rises, may pass some internal threshold; then, when it does so, it pops above the 
clouds and into conscious awareness. In other words, they propose that consciousness works 
very much the same way that perceptual decisions work. 
This new work [6] takes as its foundation an ostensibly unrelated, but also very influ-
ential, set of studies showing that when viewing a field of moving dots, the perception of co-
herent motion obeys certain laws of sequential sampling [8]. Specialized neurons in the mid-
dle temporal (MT) brain region monitor motion in small patches of space, albeit in a noisy 
way, and these monitoring signals are integrated into a decision variable. In monkeys, this 
variable can be measured in the responses of neurons in one particular brain region, and it 
obeys several lawful rules. In particular, it rises to a specific threshold and, when that thresh-
old is achieved, a decision to act is initiated. These same sequential sampling principles apply 
  
to other forms of decision-making as well, including stopping decisions, economic decisions 
and abstract strategic decisions [9–12]. 
The key thing to know about this process, known as bounded evidence accumulation, 
is that its signature is a close correspondence between threshold crossing time and decision 
accuracy. Thus, the key result of the Kang et al. [6] study is that easier trials (those with more 
coherent motion) showed more rapid perceptual reports; a bounded drift-diffusion model pre-
dicted the timing of the reports.  
In a second experiment, Kang et al. [6] allowed subjects to indicate the time at which 
they experienced the percept. This allowed them to know the time at which the decision was 
made. It also allowed them to calibrate the first experiment and answer a question that has 
heretofore puzzled philosophers - can we place any trust into the subjective estimate of con-
scious awareness? 
 
Implications for theories of decision-making 
Systems neuroscientists are, ostensibly, philosophical materialists and monists. That is, we 
believe that, as inscrutable as consciousness seems, it is nothing more than a product of pro-
saic neural circuit principles. But accepting this idea in theory doesn’t make it any easier to 
intuitively get what consciousness is. As a consequence, consciousness is often a bit mystical 
and a bit separated from the rest of cognitive neuroscience.  
This new study [6] offers the possibility to see, through a glass darkly, how con-
sciousness might be eventually reduced to simpler processes. Specifically, it suggests that our 
minds contains a large and heterogeneous pool of mostly unconscious notions that wax and 
wane with endogenous and exogenous demands; sometimes, when some coherent thoughts 
wax enough, they cross some threshold and ‘pierce’, to use the authors’ term, the veil of con-
sciousness and enter conscious awareness.  
  
In the case of dot motion, these notions are guesses about the direction of motion. Af-
ter all, neurons in MT are noisy and plentiful — at any moment, a large number are signaling 
every possible direction of motion. The only time we perceive the motion consciously though 
is when enough are making a coherent signal (that is, are in agreement) that their collective 
activity passes some sort of threshold. The analogy to other processes is straightforward; in-
deed, the ideas from the dot motion task have already been applied to other sensory domains, 
like form vision and auditory perception, as well as to economic decisions, executive control, 
and motor plans. It should be difficult to imaging it would apply to conscious awareness as 
well. 
This view is appealing because it allows a direct link to a body of literature on the 
neuroscience of perceptual decision-making. We have a good understanding of how activity 
of single neurons in areas MT and LIP (lateral intraparietal cortex) correspond to these con-
stituent notions; we have a sense of how they can cohere, and how both exogenous and en-
dogenous factors regulate that process [8]. And we have some understanding of how that 
threshold is implemented. Moreover, this framework has been influential in neuroscience, 
and applies beyond the scope of perception, to action planning, and even abstract things like 
strategic adjustment. 
This reductive view offers a solution to an important problem in consciousness: how 
are the contents of consciousness selected? In a conventional view, we need a central execu-
tive, a super-conscious homunculus, to scan the possible contents of consciousness and 
choose one, and somehow shove the chosen one forward. In the reductive view, on the other 
hand, achieving consciousness is a bottom-up process; it results from coordinated signaling 
with no central executive. Such emergent, bottom-up controlled systems are not necessarily 
intuitive, but they apply to many biological systems, and may apply to executive functions in 
the human brain [13]. And they may apply to consciousness as well: for example, Dennett 
  
[14] has proposed that conscious awareness may work the way (the emergent process of) be-
coming famous works: no agent decides who will become famous, it is a by-product of the 
interactions that constitute human society. 
 
Implications for consciousness 
The new paper of Kang et al. [6] also prompts some new thinking about the nature of con-
sciousness itself. Recent scientific studies of perceptual consciousness triangulate around 
three separate elements of conscious processing. That is, the main differences between theo-
ries of consciousness lie in the weight given to one of these aspects relative to the other two. 
The three elements can be summarised, rather alliteratively, as Input, Intent, and Insight. 
Input refers to the raw consciousness of sentient experience, typically triggered by a 
sensory input. It corresponds to the philosophical concept of qualia, and typically forms a key 
content of conscious experience. In the new study [6], the input element refers to the percep-
tual content that the dots are moving in one direction, rather than another. The neural sub-
strate for this content is thought to be area MT.  
Intent in the context of perceptual decision-making means being ‘on task’. It is what 
an animal or a person is engaged in processing at a particular time, and it determines the fo-
cus of their attention. In this study [6], participants are asked to perceive motion direction: 
they are looking at the screen, attending to the dots, and ready to respond. Key mechanisms 
for the role of intent in determining conscious content are the recurrent, top-down projections 
from frontal and associative areas into primary sensory cortices ([15]). These recurrent pro-
jections are thought to play a major role in directing and coordinating processing of input in-
formation, so that afferent information is selected [16], or even constructed [17] for current 
purposes, rather than simply passively received. 
  
Finally, the insight aspect of consciousness refers to the ‘aha’ moment, typically asso-
ciated with realising the solution to a problem, or grasping the meaning of an event. This has 
been linked to a sudden ‘ignition’ of a global workspace, characterised by an increased con-
nectivity and long-range interaction between multiple cortical areas [18]. Interestingly, the 
global workspace tradition of studying consciousness has often focused on tasks involving 
mental operations on stimuli that are explicitly semantic or symbolic (for example, words and 
numbers). The task in the present study [6] seems simpler, and is perceptual rather than sym-
bolic. 
Theories of perceptual consciousness can be broadly classified according to the rela-
tive importance they accord to phenomenality versus information processing. Phenomenal 
accounts will typically place a strong emphasis on inputs while downplaying insight. Ac-
counts that treat consciousness as the subjective upshot of current cognitive operations, such 
as working memory accounts, typically downplay inputs and emphasise insight [19]. This 
dimension of variation among consciousness theories is worth spelling out explicitly, because 
the present study involves a quite distinctive, even radical, reorganisation of the traditional 
contrast between input and insight accounts. Strikingly, the new paper [6] focusses on input 
consciousness, in a simple perceptual decision-making task, yet the experience that it produc-
es has the subjective character and the formal computational properties of insight. Partici-
pants need only figure out the net direction of dot motion. Multiple occipito-parietal areas 
have specific detector neurons that appear to be specialised for this computation. 
Previous work by the same group showed that neurons in monkey area LIP perform a 
simple evidence-based computation which is sufficient (though perhaps not necessary) to 
make the perceptual decision. What monkeys experience in these tasks is much harder to as-
sess, because they cannot tell us directly — though they do seem at least to experience that a 
particular perceptual decision is harder or easier [20]. The Kang et al. [6] paper shows that 
  
the process of evidence accumulation within a delimited input-processing module can also 
lead to a distinctive, reportable experience of decision, which the authors term an ‘aha mo-
ment’. 
This seems remarkably like insight. However, the key features of global connectivity, 
problem solving, symbol manipulation, linguistic meaning, and ‘higher’ cognition all appear 
absent here. Instead, the present paper suggests that accumulation of input evidence, perhaps 
by a single encapsulated sensory-processing module may be sufficient for the insight element 
of perceptual consciousness. The Kang et al. [6] paper thus seems to break the currently-
dominant link between insight and a symbolic, problem-solving aspect of consciousness. 
If so, the link between insight-like features of consciousness and massive cortical in-
terconnection may be overstated. Insight may be more like a threshold of input evidence, than 
like an ignition of symbolic thought. The paper ends with an intriguing, perhaps bold claim 
that the problems of consciousness may not, in fact, be as intractable and scientifically elu-
sive as is sometimes claimed. By suggesting that insight-like features of consciousness can be 
clearly linked to input-like features, this paper calls into question some of the stressed in-
sight-based global workspace theories. Specifically, the Kang et al. [6] paper suggests that 
cumulation of input evidence may be sufficient for an ‘aha moment’ phenomenon. 
 
Conclusion 
Kang et al. [6] did not particularly set out to investigate the intent aspect of consciousness, 
and this remains an enigma. It remains unclear how and why people, and monkeys, are able, 
at will, to latch their cognitive resources onto a set of moving dots. Their new study takes a 
strongly bottom-up approach: this is a simplifying and justifiable decision. The exceptional 
feature of consciousness may be our ability to deploy cognitive resources to what we current-
ly want to focus on, rather than our ability to achieve insight by doing so. We began this 
  
commentary with Libet’s investigations of willed action. Perhaps the remarkable feature of 
attention and will is not the fact that willing an action can sometimes involve an ‘aha mo-
ment’, but rather the distinctive human capacity to voluntarily switch engagement between 
different tasks, and different action goals, from one moment to the next. 
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In Brief: 
A new study of perceptual decision making in which subjects were asked to report, after indi-
cating their choice, precisely when they felt they had made a decision, supports the idea that 
conscious awareness occurs when evidence has accumulated beyond some threshold. 
